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CQB-Team.com • "What the Enemy Should Not Know"
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"What the Enemy Should Not Know"

Posted: Thu Feb 20, 2014 12:29 pm
by Ryan
Discussing tactics online. We've done it quite a frigging lot. But some people think it is unjust and puts people in danger. What are your thoughts?

Re: "What the Enemy Should Not Know"

Posted: Fri Jan 16, 2015 11:39 am
by jcheng14
A lot of what we talk about is years behind what bleeding edge is. None of us (I think) are any SF or whatever so we don't know what they develop when they develop it. I'm getting closer to the bleeding edge through some of the people in my training group being some of those special guys.

Here's the biggest thing though. The shooting is all the same. The TTP's change. Because they want to keep you from getting shot. If it's a perfect TTP performed by perfect operators then it shouldn't matter if they know what is coming. Right now the bleeding edge is good enough so that I can know whats coming and see them, and before I can take my rifle off safe it is in one corner and I am on the ground bagged and flexcuffed.

I think sharing information is good. Training is paramount. You can have that 100% TTP but if you can only perform it 75%, then an 80% TTP performed at 100% will still be better. We share information because that first technique has more potential and we want people to get to it. But you have to train to be able to use the technique to full effectiveness.

Re: "What the Enemy Should Not Know"

Posted: Sat Jan 17, 2015 2:56 am
by Ryan
There's quite a few current and ex SF and SP on these forums. Interesting way of putting it jcheng.

Re: "What the Enemy Should Not Know"

Posted: Sun Jan 18, 2015 2:51 am
by jimothy_183
I agree, TTPs change but skills are all the same. A school called TigerSwan founded by ex CAG guys say that same sort of thing. “There are no such things as advanced shooting skills, only perfect execution of the fundamentals under stress.”

Re: "What the Enemy Should Not Know"

Posted: Tue Nov 01, 2016 5:57 pm
by Breacher01
The opposition(not enemy) should not know our:

- Identities, because they could target us or our family.
- Capabilities, so they can't prepare themselves.
- Time we plan to knock their doors.
- Firepower we bring along.
- Any Intel we have on them.

In my Private security/contractor time these were often the same, but we often didn't know about an exchange of fire beforehand as well. Thing were different though.

Re: "What the Enemy Should Not Know"

Posted: Tue Nov 15, 2016 11:22 pm
by bria
Disclaimer : I'm not an operator, and I don't plan on saying how to do your job. If you thought that what I said, think instead that I don't know how to convey my opinion. :)

coming from a whole different branch, we do treat security a little different.
In computer science , there is a principle known as the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerckhoffs's_principle.
The idea behind it is simple : what must be secret is the key, not how to encode/decode the data.
Another way of saying it : If the way to encode/decode is known to the ennemy, then it mustn't affect the security encoded messages (if the key, the true secret, isn't known).

The key is pretty specific data, of little size, and known only to the one in the need (here : the unit). Much easier to protect than the algorithm wich must be in possession of anybody using the encryption (here : any unit trained together one time or another)

Applied to the actual case,
How the mission is affected if your gross capabilities/TTPS/... are known to the ennemy ?

If you find it put you in danger, then amha, it will be for the best to find a way of mitigate this risk. The question isn't "if" but "when".
SF had also person of no-allegiance ... when it's not their predecessor which give the training (remember the cold war and U.S. SF training some middle-east "rebels" against the soviet ? )

How to take down a room should'nt be "SECRET".
The fact that for this specific mission, you will use an explosive breach on the wall instead of a rapelling is the "key", hence the true secret.

(I know that a some police forces uses their cellphone because Tetra isn't so great everywhere. We are exactly in the Kerckhoffs' principle with the GSM : the cipher was proprietary , and absolutely "unbreakable". Well, actually anybody with less than $1000 could decode in near-realtime gsm commuication in his vicinity.
Think of it next-time you see someone uses a cellphone for anything sensitive ;) )

Re: "What the Enemy Should Not Know"

Posted: Sat Nov 19, 2016 8:47 pm
by Breacher01
How to take down a room should'nt be "SECRET".
No, we always have know a JDAM is always a fool proof rule to take a room.

You speak of rooms, where you should be discussing crappy doorways. As a rule there can be someone inside there or not, a second rule is they can be hostile or not, a third is that even a doorway can lead to another brick wall.

By kicking in a door you will find out if there is a room behind there. by entering it/ exposing yourself in some way in the door frame you might find out if and/or where someone is in there. If they want to, or going to shoot you is unknown until the bullets start flying.

Kerckhoffs principle does not apply here.
first of all we kick in doors, or destroy them otherwise if need be, because we know we don't have 300 years computing power(even with Moore's law chucked in there...)

A key is the last thing I use for opening doors, lockpicking , brute force or even explosive force give me a far greater chance of opening a door, compared to trying out every possible bitting there can be on a key for that lock. with a five pin lock I can try anywhere between 1 and 100.000 different keys. Software-wise a key phrase with 5x10 known is peanuts for a Casio watch... IRL on a door alternatives are the only viable option if you don't want to bring millions of keys with you.

Computer sciences and real life things seem pretty far from each other don't you think? What is the guys door/lock I need to open has been defective for years? That's also possible.
How to take down a room should'nt be "SECRET".
The fact that for this specific mission, you will use an explosive breach on the wall instead of a rapelling is the "key", hence the true secret.
except for the dot this is actually a contradiction in terminus

With a cellphone actually Signal is a good alternative(just delete any local files on both sides ASAP).

For defense short range radio services/trunked systems tetra is years behind on whats currently used for critical communications, we still have them, but ...(I was about to name the systems we now use for voice)... since communication is instantly the risk of decoding is negligible. If you know your bands, modulation, encryption and latest porto systems for medium-short range you know what I mean.

Re: "What the Enemy Should Not Know"

Posted: Tue Nov 22, 2016 10:11 pm
by bria

I didn't really understand your reply, except it seems to have been misinterpreted my post (but as I put on the disclaimer, I did had difficulty to express my opinion).

What I wanted to say is that if we apply the kerchkoff principle
The portofolio of procedures, and the "how to execute" theses procedures have no reason to be secret (for example slicing the pie, how to kick effectively a door, and so on).
The operationnal security being essentially on the following secret : which procedure(s) you will use for which situation/mission/....

And concerning the "we speak of computer science <=> we want to do 10¹⁴ operations but wen can't do them IRL", I really don't understand.
Kerchkoff is on the information & security theory, not from cryptanalysis.

I only wanted to bring a new angle for the topic (how much of a procedure could be public), that's all.

A little pic I think we will all agree on concerning cryptanalysis, security and IRL :)

And to continue on the irrelevant part I introduce :
signal (and it's derivate what's app, appolo, etc...) is cryptographically sound ... .
If you want to protect the content of the messages, that should be good. But it doesn't prevent a specific third partie (the enterprise giving you the service) to know who speaks with who.
This last metadata could be of great interest for some intelligence groups :)
It is enough to protect against a standard eavesdropper.

Concerning the "tactical" radio , that's an hardware reserved for military and special operations police groups in my knowledge.
As far as I know it, the simple "Men In Blue" doesn't have access to them.

Re: "What the Enemy Should Not Know"

Posted: Fri Nov 25, 2016 6:10 am
by Breacher01
I know I took the crypto-oligy part a bit far, but it is not really comparable to high risk security/arrests and counter terrorism/intelligence related work.

communications is definitely a integral part, but that wasn't your point I believe.

My point was and remains every action has elements which are just not predictable. we even take care of removing doormats so no one has the chance of slipping on it while struggling the suspect out of his place he's arrested. I think cryptology in its primary form doesn't assume the butterfly effect, where in "boots on the grounds" insertions there is an impossible amount of data to compute to exactly determine the end result or actions taken during an insertion.

It really comes down to training, individual skills and the execution of them as one element.

if you have the need to discuss communication, encryption and systems used at least in western-European countries, I think some form of identification is in order.

ps: my second point was that real time communications encrypted to the level a normal desktop computer takes 300 years or more would be up to irrelevant to try and decrypt. I hope my entire team died a natural death before our recent, real time and future communications can be decrypted ;)